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On 26 June 2026, the District Court of Nicosia delivered its judgment in General Application No. 199/2022 and 200/2022, dealing with issues concerning the nature and extent of a beneficiary’s right to obtain disclosure of documents and information from a trustee in relation to a trust, the trust property and its administration.
The decision is of particular importance, as the Court noted that it had not identified any Cyprus case law dealing with the issues before it. It therefore provides important first-instance guidance on a matter which does not appear to have been previously examined in detail by Cyprus case law.
The case was handled by Constantinos Chr. Clerides on behalf of the Interested Parties, who were two of the three beneficiaries of the trust.
The application concerned a request by one beneficiary for disclosure of a wide range of documents and information from the trustee of a Cyprus international trust. The requested material included, among other things, trust constitutional documents, information regarding the trust property and its ownership structure, documents relating to underlying companies or entities, possible letters of wishes, accounts, valuations, financial information, correspondence and information relating to other trusts.
The Court held that the application succeeded only in part. It ordered disclosure of:
(a) the trust deed together with any documents amending it from the date of creation of the trust to date; and
(b) the accounts of the trust for the last three years.
The application was dismissed in respect of the remaining documents, information and categories of disclosure sought.
Section 11 of the International Trusts Law
The Court first examined section 11 of the International Trusts Law, Law 69(I)/1992.
The Court held that, on the wording of section 11, the trustee may disclose the documents and information listed in section 11(1)(a)-(e) only if this is permitted by the trust instrument.
Even where the person requesting the information is a beneficiary, the matter remains within the trustee’s discretion. The trustee may proceed with disclosure only if, in the trustee’s opinion, such disclosure is necessary and safeguards the best interests of the trust, and always subject to the terms of the trust instrument.
As regards section 11(2), the Court held that an order for disclosure may only be made by a court before which civil or criminal proceedings are pending, and only where the Court is satisfied that the disclosure concerns information which is of substantial importance for the outcome of those proceedings. On the facts, the Court held that there was no basis to order disclosure under section 11(2) of Law 69(I)/1992.
The Court also considered the trust instrument, which contained provisions headed “Non Disclosure” and “Disclosure”. The “Non Disclosure” clause provided that “subject to an order of any competent court the Trustees shall not be bound to disclose to any person any document or other matter relating to this Trust”. The “Disclosure” clause provided, among other matters, that the Trustees could disclose certain information only subject to obtaining the written consent of the settlor and the beneficiaries, unless ordered by a competent court.
As no such consent had been obtained, the Court held that the wide request for disclosure could not be granted on the basis of the trust instrument either.
The Court’s inherent jurisdiction
The Court then turned to section 14 of Law 69(I)/1992 and the law of equity, considering whether disclosure could be ordered under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.
The main legal basis was drawn from the Privy Council decision in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709. The Court adopted the principle that a beneficiary’s right to seek disclosure of trust documents is “one aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise (and where appropriate intervene in) the administration of trusts”.
Accordingly, a beneficiary does not have an automatic right to access trust documents. The Court emphasised that a beneficiary cannot demand access to trust documents as of right and does not have an “equitable proprietary right” in such documents.
With reference to Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd and Re Londonderry’s Settlement [1965] Ch 918, the Court adopted the approach that, when considering a request by a beneficiary for disclosure of trust documents, three issues arise:
first, whether the particular beneficiary should receive any disclosure at all;
second, which categories of documents should properly be disclosed, whether fully or in redacted form; and
third, what restrictions or safeguards should be imposed on the use of the disclosed documents and information.
The principle derived from In re Cowin, as referred to in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd, further confirms that no beneficiary, and especially no discretionary object, has an “entitlement as of right to disclosure of anything which can plausibly be described as a trust document”. Where issues of personal or commercial confidentiality arise, the Court must balance the interests of the beneficiaries, the trustees and third parties.
Lewis v Tamplin and disclosure requested by one beneficiary
The Court also referred to Lewis v Tamplin [2018] EWHC 777 (Ch).
That case was relevant for two principles. First, the fact that a request for disclosure is not supported by all beneficiaries is not, in itself, a bar to relief, since the interests of all beneficiaries may not be aligned. Second, it is not necessary to establish a prior suspicion of mismanagement before disclosure can be ordered, provided the Court is satisfied that, in the circumstances, information should be provided as a basis for reviewing the conduct of the trustee.
That principle, however, does not lead to unlimited disclosure. The Court must still examine the scope, purpose and proportionality of the request.
Trust deed, letters of wishes and the Londonderry principles
Breakspear v Ackland [2008] EWHC 220 (Ch) was central to the distinction between the trust deed and letters of wishes.
As regards the trust deed, the Court accepted that such documents should generally be disclosed to beneficiaries because they define the powers of the trustees. There is, in principle, no confidentiality attaching to the existence and limits of those powers. Their disclosure is necessary so that it can be verified that the trustees are acting within the scope of their authority.
By contrast, letters of wishes operate within the boundaries of the trust deed and relate to the trustees’ confidential exercise of discretionary powers. In the case before the Court, any such letters of wishes were not ordered to be disclosed. The Court held that no sufficient reason had been given as to why their disclosure was necessary. They did not define the trustee’s powers, but represented the non-binding wishes of the settlor and related to the manner in which the trustee exercised its discretion.
Breakspear v Ackland was also relied upon in relation to the Londonderry principles. The Court noted that the exercise of dispositive discretionary powers by trustees is, from start to finish, “an essentially confidential process”. This principle protects the trustee’s discretionary function and the proper administration of the trust.
Distinction from civil litigation disclosure
The Court also emphasised that disclosure by a trustee to a beneficiary must not be confused with disclosure for the purposes of civil litigation. This distinction was made with reference, among other authorities, to O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581, AT & T Istel Ltd v Tully [1999] AC 45, Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd and Breakspear v Ackland.
The purposes of the two exercises are distinct, as are the legal principles governing them. In the first case, disclosure is connected with trust law and the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of trusts. In the second, disclosure is a matter of procedure and evidence.
This distinction is important because a request by a beneficiary to a trustee should not be converted into a broad investigative exercise for the purposes of other disputes.
The purpose and limits of disclosure
The Court stressed that the reasons for which disclosure is sought are relevant and must be taken into account. Disclosure must be connected with the protection of the proper interests of the beneficiaries and the trust. Personal objectives of the applicant beneficiary are irrelevant.
On the facts, the Court held that the reasons advanced for the wide disclosure sought did not concern the protection of the beneficiaries, but rather the obtaining of information which could potentially assist the applicant in other objectives. The Court considered such an investigative exercise to fall outside the scope of its supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of a trust.
The Court also referred to Lewin on Trusts, 20th edition, paragraph [21-038], adopting the principle that a beneficiary may seek reasonable information and supporting documents concerning transactions involving trust property. However, trustees are not required to answer “never-ending lengthy and voluminous enquiries” beyond what is reasonable. In this case, the extent of the requested disclosure was held to be manifestly excessive and disproportionate.
Trust accounts
As regards trust accounts, the Court referred to The Royal National Lifeboat Institution and others v Headley and another [2016] EWHC 1948 (Ch).
The principle adopted was that the right to an accounting and to see trust documents as part of that process is also an aspect of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise and, where appropriate, intervene in the administration of a trust. However, it does not follow that all trust accounts and related documents must be disclosed to all beneficiaries upon request.
The question depends on what is necessary in the circumstances for the beneficiaries to be able to appreciate, verify and, if necessary, vindicate their own rights against the trustees in respect of the administration of the trust.
In the case before the Court, given the trustee’s stated intention to terminate the trust, the Court held that it was not unreasonable for the beneficiaries to be given a financial picture of the trust. It therefore ordered disclosure of the trust accounts for the last three years. However, disclosure was not extended to underlying companies and entities.
Significance of the decision
General Application No. 199/2022 and 200/2022 provides important first-instance guidance on the disclosure duties of trustees and the rights of beneficiaries of Cyprus international trusts.
The decision confirms that a beneficiary does not have an automatic right to wide disclosure of trust documents and information. Disclosure is considered within the framework of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise the administration of trusts. It also confirms that trust disclosure should not be confused with civil litigation disclosure, that trust deeds are treated differently from letters of wishes, that the exercise of discretionary powers by trustees is protected by confidentiality, and that excessive or disproportionate requests, particularly in the absence of evidence or indications of bad faith or breach of fiduciary duties, fall outside the permissible scope of disclosure.
The outcome reflects that balance. The Court ordered disclosure of the trust deed, any amendments to it and the trust accounts for the last three years, while rejecting the wider disclosure sought.
